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a  b  s  t  r a  c t
This paper offers  an active inference account  of choice behaviour  and  learning. It  focuses  on the  distinc-
tion  between goal-directed  and habitual behaviour  and  how they  contextualise  each other. We show
that  habits emerge  naturally (and autodidactically) from  sequential  policy optimisation  when  agents
are  equipped  with  state-action  policies. In  active inference, behaviour  has  explorative  (epistemic)  and
exploitative  (pragmatic) aspects that are  sensitive  to  ambiguity and  risk respectively,  where  epistemic
(ambiguity-resolving)  behaviour  enables pragmatic  (reward-seeking)  behaviour  and  the  subsequent
emergence  of habits.  Although  goal-directed and habitual policies  are  usually  associated  with  model-based
and  model-free  schemes,  we  find  the  more important distinction is between belief-free  and belief-based
schemes.  The underlying (variational)  belief updating provides a comprehensive  (if  metaphorical)  pro-
cess theory for  several phenomena,  including the  transfer  of dopamine  responses,  reversal  learning,  habit
formation  and  devaluation.  Finally, we show  that  active inference reduces  to a classical  (Bellman)  scheme,
in  the  absence  of ambiguity.
©  2016 The  Authors.  Published by Elsevier Ltd.  This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Contents
1. Introduction  . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . 863
2.  Active  inference and learning  . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . 864
2.1. The  generative  model  . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . 865
2.2. Behaviour  action  and reflexes  . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . 867
2.3. Free  energy and  expected free energy  . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . .  . .  . . .  . . . . . 867
2.4. Belief  updating . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . 868
2.5. Summary . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . 869
3.  Relationship to Bellman formulations . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . 869
4.  Simulations of foraging .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  871
4.1. The  setup . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . . . . .  .  872
5.  Simulations of learning . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  874
5.1. Context and reversal  learning  . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . 874
5.2. Habit  formation  and devaluation  . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . .  . . 874
5.3. Epistemic  habit  acquisition  under ambiguity . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . 874
5.4.  Summary . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . 875
∗ Corresponding author at: The  Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, 12  Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom.
E-mail  addresses: k.friston@ucl.ac.uk (K. Friston), thomas.fitzgerald@ucl.ac.uk (T. FitzGerald), f.rigoli@ucl.ac.uk (F.  Rigoli), philipp.schwartenbeck.12@ucl.ac.uk
(P. Schwartenbeck), jdoherty@hss.caltech.edu (J. O’Doherty), giovanni.pezzulo@istc.cnr.it (G. Pezzulo).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.06.022
0149-7634/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the  CC  BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
K. Friston et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879 863
6.  Conclusion  . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . .  . 875
Disclosure  statement . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . 877
Acknowledgements  . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . 877
Appendix  A  .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . 877
References . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  .  . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  .  . 878
1. Introduction
There are many perspectives on the distinction between goal-
directed and habitual behaviour (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Yin
and Knowlton, 2006; Keramati et al., 2011; Dezfouli and Balleine,
2013; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Pezzulo et al., 2013). One popular
view rests upon model-based and model-free learning (Daw et al.,
2005, 2011). In model-free approaches, the value of a  state (e.g.,
being in a particular location) is  learned through trial and error,
while actions are chosen to  maximise the value of the next state (e.g.
being at a rewarded location). In contrast, model-based schemes
compute a value-function of states under a  model of behavioural
contingencies (Gläscher et al., 2010). In this paper, we  consider a
related distinction; namely, the distinction between policies that
rest upon beliefs about states and those that  do not. In other words,
we consider the distinction between choices that depend upon a
(free energy) functional of beliefs about states, as opposed to a
(value) function of states.
Selecting actions based upon the value of states only works
when the states are known. In other words, a value function is only
useful if there is no ambiguity about the states to  which the value
function is applied. Here, we consider the more general problem
of behaving under ambiguity (Pearson et al., 2014). Ambiguity is
characterized by an uncertain mapping between hidden states and
outcomes (e.g., states that are partially observed) – and generally
calls for policy selection or decisions under uncertainty; e.g. (Alagoz
et al., 2010; Ravindran, 2013). In  this setting, optimal behaviour
depends upon beliefs about states, as opposed to  states per se. This
means that choices necessarily rest on inference, where optimal
choices must first resolve ambiguity. We will see that this reso-
lution, through epistemic behaviour, is an emergent property of
(active) inference under prior preferences or goals. These prefer-
ences are simply outcomes that an agent or phenotype expects
to encounter (Friston et al., 2015). So, can habits be learned in an
ambiguous world? In this paper, we show that epistemic habits
emerge naturally from observing the consequences of (one’s own)
goal-directed behaviour. This follows from the fact that ambiguity
can  be resolved, unambiguously, by epistemic actions.
To illustrate the distinction between belief-based and belief-free
policies, consider the following examples: a predator (e.g., an owl)
has to locate a  prey (e.g., a  field mouse). In this instance, the best
goal-directed behaviour would be  to move to  a  vantage point (e.g.,
overhead) to resolve ambiguity about the prey’s location. The corre-
sponding belief-free policy would be to fly straight to the prey, from
any position, and consume it.  Clearly, this belief-free approach will
only work if the prey reveals its location unambiguously (and the
owl knows exactly where it is). A similar example could be a  preda-
tor waiting for the return of its prey to a  waterhole. In this instance,
the choice of whether to wait depends on the time elapsed since the
prey last watered. The common aspect of these examples is that the
belief state of the agent determines the optimal behaviour. In the
first example, this involves soliciting cues from the environment
that resolve ambiguity about the context (e.g., location of a prey).
In  the second, optimal behaviour depends upon beliefs about the
past (i.e., memory). In both instances, a  value-function of the states
of the world cannot specify behaviour, because behaviour depends
on beliefs or knowledge (i.e., belief states as opposed to states of the
world).
Usually, in  Markov decision processes (MDP), belief-based prob-
lems call for an augmented state-space that  covers the belief or
information states of an agent (Averbeck, 2015) – known as a  belief
MDP  (Oliehoek et al., 2005). Although this is an elegant solution
to  optimising policies under uncertainty about (partially observed)
states, the composition of belief states can become computation-
ally intractable; not least because belief MDPs are defined over
a  continuous belief state-space (Cooper, 1988; Duff, 2002; Bonet
and Geffner, 2014). Active inference offers a simpler approach by
absorbing any value-function into a single functional of beliefs.
This functional is  variational free energy that  scores the surprise
or uncertainty associated with a belief, in light of observed (or
expected) outcomes. This means that acting to  minimise free
energy resolves ambiguity and realises unsurprising or preferred
outcomes. We will see that this single objective function can be
unpacked in a number of ways that fit comfortably with established
formulations of optimal choice behaviour and foraging.
In  summary, schemes that optimise state-action mappings –
via a  value-function of states – could be considered as habitual,
whereas goal-directed behaviour is  quintessentially belief-based.
This begs the question as to  whether habits can emerge under
belief-based schemes like active inference. In other words, can
habits be learned by simply observing one’s own  goal-directed
behaviour? We  show this is the case; moreover, habit formation
is an inevitable consequence of equipping agents with the hypoth-
esis that habits are sufficient to  attain goals. We illustrate these
points, using formal (information theoretic) arguments and simu-
lations. These simulations are based upon a  generic (variational)
belief update scheme that shows several behaviours reminiscent
of real neuronal and behavioural responses. We  highlight some of
these behaviours in an effort to  establish the construct validity of
active inference.
This paper comprises four sections. The first provides a  descrip-
tion of active inference, which combines our earlier formulations
of planning as inference (Friston et al., 2014) with Bayesian model
averaging (FitzGerald et al., 2014) and learning (FitzGerald et al.,
2015a, 2015b). Importantly, action (i.e. policy selection), perception
(i.e., state estimation) and learning (i.e., reinforcement learning) all
minimise the same quantity; namely, variational free energy. In  this
formulation, habits are learned under the assumption (or hypoth-
esis) there is an optimal mapping from one state to the next, that  is
not context or time-sensitive.1 Our key interest was to  see if habit-
learning emerges as a  Bayes-optimal habitisation of goal-directed
behaviour, when circumstances permit. This follows a  general line
of thinking, where habits are effectively learned as the invariant
aspects of goal-directed behaviour (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2013;
Pezzulo et al., 2013, 2014, 2015). It  also speaks to the arbitration
between goal-directed and habitual policies (Lee et al., 2014). The
second section considers variational belief updating from the per-
spective of standard approaches to policy optimisation based on the
Bellman optimality principle. In brief, we  will look at dynamic pro-
gramming schemes for Markovian decision processes that are  cast
in terms of value-functions – and how the ensuing value (or policy)
iteration schemes can be understood in terms of active inference.
1 Here, we  mean context insensitive in the sense of Thrailkill and Bouton (2015). In
other words, context refers to  outcome contingencies; not the paradigmatic context.
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The third section uses simulations of foraging in a  radial maze to
illustrate some key aspects of inference and learning; such as the
transfer of dopamine responses to conditioned stimuli, as agents
become familiar with their environmental contingencies (Fiorillo
et al., 2003). The final section considers context and habit learning,
concluding with simulations of reversal learning, habit formation
and devaluation (Balleine and Ostlund, 2007). The aim of these sim-
ulations is to illustrate how the above phenomena emerge from a
single imperative (to minimise free energy) and how they follow
naturally from each other.
2. Active inference and learning
This section provides a brief overview of active inference. The
formalism used in this paper builds upon our previous treatments
of Markov decision processes (Schwartenbeck et al., 2013; Friston
et al., 2014, 2015; Pezzulo et al., 2015, 2016). Specifically, we extend
sequential policy optimisation to include action-state policies of
the sort optimised by  dynamic programming and backwards induc-
tion (Bellman, 1952; Howard, 1960). Active inference is  based upon
the premise that everything minimises variational free energy. This
leads to some surprisingly simple update rules for action, percep-
tion, policy selection, learning and the encoding of uncertainty (i.e.,
precision) that generalise established normative approaches.
In principle, the following scheme can be applied to  any
paradigm or choice behaviour. Earlier applications have been
used to model waiting games (Friston et al., 2013) the urn
task and evidence accumulation (FitzGerald et al., 2015a, 2015b),
trust games from behavioural economics (Moutoussis et al.,
2014; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015a, 2015b), addictive behaviour
(Schwartenbeck et al., 2015c), two-step maze tasks (Friston et al.,
2015)  and engineering benchmarks such as the mountain car prob-
lem (Friston et al., 2012a). Empirically, it is  has been used in the
setting of computational fMRI (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015a). More
generally, in  theoretical biology, active inference is  a  necessary
aspect of any biological self-organisation (Friston, 2013), where free
energy reflects survival probability in an evolutionary setting (Sella
and Hirsh, 2005).
In brief, active inference separates the problems of optimising
action and perception by assuming that action fulfils predictions
based upon perceptual inference or state-estimation. Optimal pre-
dictions are based on (sensory) evidence that is  evaluated in
relation to a  generative model of (observed) outcomes. This allows
one to frame behaviour as fulfilling optimistic predictions, where
the inherent optimism is prescribed by prior preferences (Friston
et al., 2014). Crucially, the generative model contains beliefs about
future states and policies, where the most likely policies lead to
preferred outcomes. This enables action to realise preferred out-
comes, based on the assumption that both action and perception
are trying to  maximise the evidence or marginal likelihood of the
generative model, as scored by variational free energy.
Fig.  1,  provides an overview of active inference in  terms of  the
functional anatomy and processes implicit in the minimisation of
variational free energy. In brief, sensory evidence is  accumulated to
Fig. 1. The functional anatomy of belief updating: sensory evidence is accumulated to optimise expectations about the current state, which are constrained by expectations
of  past (and future) states. This corresponds to  state estimation under each policy the agent entertainments. The quality of each policy is  evaluated in the ventral prefrontal
cortex  – possibly in combination with ventral striatum (van der Meer et al.,  2012) – in terms of its expected free energy. This  evaluation and the ensuing policy selection rest
on  expectations about future states. Note that the explicit encoding of future states lends this  scheme the ability to  plan and explore. After the free energy of each policy has
been  evaluated, it is used to  predict the subsequent hidden state through Bayesian model averaging (over policies). This enables an action to  be selected that is most likely to
realise  the predicted state. Once an action has been selected, it generates a  new observation and the cycle begins again. Fig. 2 illustrates the formal basis of this computational
anatomy, in terms of belief updating.
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form beliefs about the current state of the world. These beliefs are
constrained by  expectations of past  (and future) states. This evi-
dence accumulation corresponds to state estimation under each
policy the agent entertainments. The quality of each policy is then
evaluated in terms of its expected free energy. The implicit policy
selection therefore depends on expectations about future states
under each policy, where the encoding of future states lends the
scheme an ability to plan and explore. After the free energies of
each policy have been evaluated, they are used to predict the next
state of the world, through Bayesian model averaging (over poli-
cies); in other words, policies that lead to  preferred outcomes have
a greater influence on predictions. This enables action to realise pre-
dicted states. Once an action has been selected, it generates a  new
observation and the perception-action cycle begins again. In what
follows, we will see how these processes emerge naturally from
the single imperative to  minimise (expected) free energy, under a
fairly generic model of the world.
As noted above, the generative model includes hidden states
in the past and the future. This enables agents to select policies
that will maximise model evidence in the future by  minimis-
ing  expected free energy. Furthermore, it enables learning about
contingencies based upon state transitions that are inferred retro-
spectively. We  will see that this leads to a Bayes-optimal arbitration
between epistemic (explorative) and pragmatic (exploitative)
behaviour that is  formally related to several established constructs;
e.g., the Infomax principle (Linsker, 1990), Bayesian surprise (Itti
and Baldi, 2009), the value of information (Howard, 1966), arti-
ficial curiosity (Schmidhuber, 1991), expected utility theory (Zak,
2004) and so on. We start by describing the generative model upon
which predictions and actions are based. We  then describe how
action is specified by  (Bayesian model averages of) beliefs about
states of the world, under different models or policies. This sec-
tion concludes by  considering the optimisation of these beliefs (i.e.,
inference and learning) through Bayesian belief updating. The third
section illustrates the formalism of the current section, using an
intuitive example.
Notation. The parameters of categorical distributions over
discrete states s  ∈ {0, 1} are denoted by  column vectors of expecta-
tions s ∈ {0, 1}, while the ∼ notation denotes sequences of variables
over time; e.g., s˜ = (s1, . . ., sT ). The entropy of a  probability distri-
bution P(s) =  Pr(S = s)  is  denoted by  H(S) =  H[P(s)] =  EP[−  ln P(s)],
while the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
is denoted by D[Q (s)||P(s)] = EQ [ln  Q (s) − ln  P(s)]. Inner and outer
products are indicated by  A · B = ATB, and A ⊗ B =  ABT respectively.
We use a hat notation to denote (natural) logarithms.
Finally, P(o|s) =  Cat(A) implies Pr(o =  i|s  = j) =  Cat(Aij).
Definition. Active inference rests on  the tuple (O, P, Q, R, S, T, U):
• A finite set of outcomes O
• A finite set of control states or actions U
• A  finite set of hidden states S
• A finite set of time sensitive policies T
• A generative process R(o˜, s˜, u˜) that generates probabilistic out-
comes o ∈ O  from (hidden) states s ∈ S and action u ∈ U
• A generative model P(o˜, s˜, ,  ) with parameters , over out-
comes, states and policies   ∈ T , where  ∈ {0, . . ., K}  returns
a sequence of actions ut = (t)
• An approximate posterior Q (s˜, ,  ) = Q (s0|). . .Q  (sT |)Q ()Q ()
over states, policies and parameters with expectations
(s
0
,  . . .,  sT ,  , )
Remarks. The generative process describes transitions among
(hidden) states in the world that  generate observed outcomes.
These transitions depend upon actions, which depend on beliefs
about the next state. In turn, these beliefs are  formed using a  gen-
erative model of how observations are generated. The generative
model describes what the agent believes about the world, where
beliefs about hidden states and policies are  encoded by expecta-
tions. Note the distinction between actions (that are part of the
generative process in the world) and policies (that are part of  the
generative model of an agent). This distinction allows actions to be
specified by beliefs about policies, effectively converting an optimal
control problem into an optimal inference problem (Attias, 2003;
Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012).
2.1. The generative model
The generative model for partially observable Markov decision
processes can be parameterised in  a  general way  as follows, where
the model parameters are  = {a, b, c, d, e, ˇ}:
(1.a)
(1.b)
(1.c)
(1.d)
(1.e)
The role of each model parameter will be unpacked when we
consider model inversion and worked examples. For reference,
Table 1 provides a brief description of this model’s states and
parameters. The corresponding (approximate) posterior over hid-
den states and parameters x  = (s˜, , ) can be expressed in  terms of
their expectations x =  (s
0
, . . ., sT , , ) and  =  (a,  b, c,  d,  e, )
(2)
In this generative model, observations depend only upon the
current state (Eq. (1.a)), while state transitions depend on a pol-
icy or sequence of actions (Eq. (1.b)). This (sequential) policy is
sampled from a  Gibbs distribution or softmax function of  expected
free energy ,  with inverse temperature or precision  (Eq.
(1.e)). Here E corresponds to prior beliefs about policies, while G is
the free energy expected under each policy (see  below). Crucially,
policies come in two flavours: when  = 0 the state transitions
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Glossary of expressions.
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do not depend on the policy and the next state is  always spec-
ified (probabilistically) by  the current state (Eq. (1.c)). In other
words, there is  one special policy that, if selected, will generate the
same state transitions and subsequent actions, irrespective of time
or context. This is the habitual or  state-action policy. Conversely,
when  > 0, transitions depend on a  sequential policy that entails
ordered sequences of actions (Eq. (1.b)).
Note that the policy is  a random variable that has to be inferred.
In other words, the agent entertains competing hypotheses or mod-
els of its behaviour, in terms of policies. This contrasts with standard
formulations, in which one (habitual) policy returns an action as a
function of each state u =  (s), as opposed to time, u =  (t). In other
words, different policies can prescribe different actions from the
same state, which is  not possible under a state-action policy. Note
also that the approximate posterior is  parameterised in terms of
expected states under each policy. In other words, we assume that
the agent keeps a  separate record of expected states – in  the past
and future – for each allowable policy. Essentially, this assumes the
agents have a short term memory for prediction and postdiction.
When interpreted in the light of hippocampal dynamics, this pro-
vides a simple explanation for phenomena like place-cell responses
and phase precession (Friston and Buzsaki, 2016). A separate repre-
sentation of trajectories for each policy can be thought of in  terms of
a saliency map, where each location corresponds to a  putative pol-
icy: e.g., a fixation point for the next saccade (Friston et al., 2012b;
Mirza et al., 2016).
The predictions that  guide action are based upon a  Bayesian
model average of policy-specific states. In other words, policies the
agent considers it is more likely to be pursuing dominate predic-
tions about the next outcome and the ensuing action. Finally, all the
conditional probabilities – including the initial state – are parame-
terised in terms of Dirichlet distributions (FitzGerald et al., 2015b).
The sufficient statistics of these distributions are concentration
parameters that can be regarded as the number of [co]occurrences
encountered in the past. In other words, they encode the number
of times various combinations of states and outcomes have been
observed, which specify their probability – and the confidence in
that probability. In what follows, we first describe how actions are
selected, given beliefs about the hidden state of the world and the
policies currently being pursued. We  will then turn to the more
difficult problem of optimising the beliefs upon which action is
based.
2.2. Behaviour action and reflexes
We associate action with reflexes that minimise the expected
KL divergence between the outcomes predicted at the next time
step and the outcome predicted after each action. Mathematically,
this can be expressed in  terms of minimising (outcome) prediction
errors as follows:
(3)
This formulation of action is considered reflexive by analogy to
motor reflexes that minimise the discrepancy between propriocep-
tive signals (primary afferents) and descending motor commands
or predictions. Heuristically, action realises expected outcomes by
minimising the expected outcome prediction error. Expectations
about the next outcome therefore enslave behaviour. If  we regard
competing policies as models of behaviour, the predicted outcome
is formally equivalent to  a Bayesian model average of outcomes,
under posterior beliefs about policies (last equality above).
2.3. Free energy and expected free energy
In  active inference, all the heavy lifting is  done by minimising
free energy with respect to expectations about hidden states, poli-
cies and parameters. Variational free energy can be expressed as a
function of the approximate posterior in  a  number of ways:
(4)
where o˜ = (o1, . . .,  ot) denotes observations up until the current
time.
Because KL divergences cannot be less than zero, the penul-
timate equality means that free energy is minimised when the
approximate posterior becomes the true posterior. At this point,
the free energy becomes the negative log evidence for the gen-
erative model (Beal, 2003). This means minimising free energy is
equivalent to  maximising model evidence, which is  equivalent to
minimising the complexity of accurate explanations for observed
outcomes (last equality).
With this equivalence in mind, we now turn to the prior beliefs
about policies that shape posterior beliefs − and the Bayesian model
averaging that determines action. Minimising free energy with
respect to expectations ensures that they encode posterior beliefs,
given observed outcomes. However, beliefs about policies rest on
outcomes in  the future, because these beliefs determine action and
action determines subsequent outcomes. This means that  policies
should, a  priori, minimise the free energy of beliefs about the future.
Eq. (1.e) expresses this formally by making the log probability of  a
policy proportional to  the free energy expected under that policy.
The expected free energy of a  policy follows from Eq. (4) (Friston
et al., 2015).
(5)
where Q˜ =  Q (o, s |) =  P(o |s)Q (s |) ≈ P(o,  s |o˜, ) and
Q (o |s, ) = P(o |s).
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In the expected free energy, relative entropy becomes mutual
information and log-evidence becomes the log-evidence expected
under the predicted outcomes. If we  associate the log prior over
outcomes with utility or  prior preferences: U(o) =  ln  P(o), the
expected free energy can also be expressed in  terms of epistemic
and extrinsic value. This means extrinsic value corresponds to
expected utility and can be associated with the log-evidence for
an agent’s model of the world expected in the future. Epistemic
value is simply the expected information gain (mutual informa-
tion) afforded to hidden states by  future outcomes (or vice-versa).
A final re-arrangement shows that complexity becomes expected
cost; namely, the KL divergence between the posterior predic-
tions and prior preferences; while accuracy becomes the accuracy,
expected under predicted outcomes (i.e. negative ambiguity). This
last equality shows how expected free energy can be evaluated rel-
atively easily: it is  just the divergence between the predicted and
preferred outcomes, minus the ambiguity (i.e., entropy) expected
under predicted states.
In summary, expected free energy is  defined in relation to prior
beliefs about future outcomes. These define the expected cost or
complexity and complete the generative model. It is  these pref-
erences that lend inference and action a  purposeful or pragmatic
(goal directed) aspect. There are several useful interpretations of
expected free energy that appeal to (and contextualise) established
constructs. For example, maximising epistemic value is  equivalent
to maximising (expected) Bayesian surprise (Schmidhuber, 1991;
Itti and Baldi, 2009), where Bayesian surprise is the KL divergence
between posterior and prior beliefs. This can also be  interpreted in
terms of the principle of maximum mutual information or  min-
imum redundancy (Barlow, 1961; Linsker, 1990; Olshausen and
Field, 1996; Laughlin, 2001). This is because epistemic value is
the mutual information between hidden states and observations.
In other words, it reports the reduction in uncertainty about hid-
den states afforded by observations. Because the KL divergence (or
information gain) cannot be less than zero, it disappears when the
(predictive) posterior is not informed by new observations. Heuris-
tically, this means epistemic policies will search out observations
that resolve uncertainty about the state of the world (e.g., foraging
to locate a prey). However, when there is  no posterior uncertainty
– and the agent is confident about the state of the world – there
can be no further information gain and epistemic value will be the
same for all policies.
When there are no preferences, the most likely policies max-
imise uncertainty or expected information over outcomes (i.e.,
keep options open), in  accord with the maximum entropy prin-
ciple (Jaynes, 1957); while minimising the entropy of outcomes,
given the state. Heuristically, this means agents will try to avoid
uninformative (low entropy) outcomes (e.g., closing one’s eyes),
while avoiding states that  produce ambiguous (high entropy) out-
comes (e.g., a noisy restaurant) (Schwartenbeck et al., 2013). This
resolution of uncertainty is closely related to satisfying artificial
curiosity (Schmidhuber, 1991; Still and Precup, 2012) and speaks
to the value of information (Howard, 1966). It is  also referred to as
intrinsic value: see (Barto et al., 2004)  for discussion of intrinsically
motivated learning. Epistemic value can be regarded as the drive
for novelty seeking behaviour (Wittmann et al., 2008; Krebs et al.,
2009; Schwartenbeck et al., 2013), in which we anticipate the res-
olution of uncertainty (e.g., opening a  birthday present). See also
(Barto et al., 2013).
The expected complexity or  cost is  exactly the same quantity
minimised in risk sensitive or KL control (Klyubin et al., 2005; van
den Broek et al., 2010), and underpins related (free energy) formu-
lations of bounded rationality based on complexity costs (Braun
et al., 2011; Ortega and Braun, 2013). In  other words, minimising
expected complexity renders behaviour risk-sensitive, while max-
imising expected accuracy renders behaviour ambiguity-sensitive.
Although the above expressions appear complicated, expected
free energy can be expressed in  a  compact and simple form in terms
of the generative model:
(6)
The two terms in  the expression for expected free energy repre-
sent risk and ambiguity sensitive contributions respectively, where
utility is  a  vector of preferences over outcomes. The decomposition
of expected free energy in terms of expected cost and ambiguity
lends a formal meaning to  risk and ambiguity: risk is the relative
entropy or uncertainty about outcomes, in relation to preferences,
while ambiguity is  the uncertainty about outcomes in relation to
the state of the world. This is  largely consistent with the use of risk
and ambiguity in  economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;  Zak,
2004; Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007; Preuschoff et al., 2008), where
ambiguity reflects uncertainty about the context (e.g., which lottery
is currently in  play).
In summary, the above formalism suggests that expected free
energy can be carved in two complementary ways: it can be
decomposed into a  mixture of epistemic and extrinsic value,
promoting explorative, novelty-seeking and exploitative, reward-
seeking behaviour respectively. Equivalently, minimising expected
free energy can be formulated as minimising a mixture of expected
cost or risk and ambiguity. This completes our  description of free
energy. We  now turn to  belief updating that is  based on minimising
free energy under the generative model described above.
2.4. Belief updating
Belief updating mediates inference and learning, where infer-
ence means optimising expectations about hidden states (policies
and precision), while learning refers to  optimising model param-
eters. This optimisation entails finding the sufficient statistics of
posterior beliefs that minimise variational free energy. These solu-
tions are (see  Appendix A):
(7)
For notational simplicity, we have used:
⌢
B =
⌢
B(()),
⌢
B0 =
⌢
C,
⌢
D  =
⌢
B
0
s
0
,   =  1/ and 0 =  (
⌢
E −   · G).
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Usually, in variational Bayes, one would iterate the above self-
consistent equations until convergence. However, we can also
obtain the solution in  a  robust and biologically more plausible fash-
ion by using a gradient descent on free energy (see Friston et al.,
under review): Solving these equations produces posterior expec-
tations that minimise free energy to  provide Bayesian estimates
of hidden variables. This means that expectations change over sev-
eral timescales: a  fast timescale that  updates posterior beliefs about
hidden states after each observation (to minimise free energy over
peristimulus time) and a  slower timescale that updates posterior
beliefs as new observations are sampled (to mediate evidence accu-
mulation over observations); see also (Penny et al., 2013).  Finally, at
the end of each sequence of observations (i.e., trial of observation
epochs) the expected (concentration) parameters are updated to
mediate learning over trials. These updates are remarkably simple
and have intuitive (neurobiological) interpretations:
Updating hidden states correspond to state estimation,  under
each policy. Because each expectation is  informed by expecta-
tions about past and future states, this scheme has the form of a
Bayesian smoother that combines (empirical) prior expectations
about hidden states with the likelihood of the current observation.
Having said this, the scheme does not  use conventional forward and
backward sweeps, because all future and past states are encoded
explicitly. In other words, representations always refer to the same
hidden state at the same time in relation to the start of the trial
– not in relation to the current time. This may  seem counterin-
tuitive but this form of spatiotemporal (place and time) encoding
finesses belief updating considerably and has a degree of plausibil-
ity in relation to  empirical findings, as discussed elsewhere (Friston
and Buzsaki, 2016).
The policy updates are just a softmax function of their log prob-
ability, which has three components: a prior based on previous
experience, the (posterior) free energy based on past outcomes
and the expected (prior) free energy based on preferences about
future outcomes. Note that prior beliefs about policies in  the gener-
ative model are supplemented or informed by the (posterior) free
energy based on outcomes. Because habits are  just another pol-
icy, the arbitration among habits and (sequential) policies rests on
their posterior probability, which is  closely related to the propos-
als in (Daw et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014)  but introduces a  risk and
ambiguity trade-off in policy selection (FitzGerald et al., 2014). Pol-
icy selection also entails the optimisation of expected uncertainty
or precision. This is expressed above in terms of the temperature
(inverse precision) of posterior beliefs about precision:  ˇ = 1/ .
One can see that temperature increases with expected free energy.
In  other words, policies that, on average, have a high expected
free energy will influence posterior beliefs about policies with less
precision.
Interestingly, the updates to  temperature (and implicitly preci-
sion) are determined by  the difference between the expected free
energy under posterior beliefs about policies and the expected free
energy under prior beliefs. This endorses the notion of reward pre-
diction errors as an explanation for dopamine responses; in the
sense that if posterior beliefs based upon current observations
reduce the expected free energy, relative to prior beliefs, then
precision will increase (FitzGerald et al., 2015a, 2015b). This can
be related to dopamine discharges that have been interpreted in
terms of changes in  expected reward (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000;
Fiorillo et al., 2003).  The role  of the neuromodulator dopamine in
encoding precision is also consistent with its multiplicative effect
in  the second update – to nuance the selection among competing
policies (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2007; Humphries et al.,
2009, 2012; Solway and Botvinick, 2012; Mannella and Baldassarre,
2015). We will return to  this later.
Finally, the updates for the parameters bear a  marked resem-
blance to classical Hebbian plasticity (Abbott and Nelson, 2000).
The transition or connectivity updates comprise two terms: an
associative term that is  a  digamma function of the accumu-
lated coincidence of past (postsynaptic) and current (presynaptic)
states (or observations under hidden causes) and a decay term
that reduces each connection as the total afferent connectivity
increases. The associative and decay terms are strictly increasing
but saturating functions of the concentration parameters. Note
that the updates for the (connectivity) parameters accumulate
coincidences over time because, unlike hidden states, parameters
are time invariant. Furthermore, the parameters encoding state
transitions have associative terms that  are modulated by  policy
expectations. In addition to  the learning of contingencies through
the parameters of the transition matrices, the vectors encoding
beliefs about the initial state and selected policy accumulate evi-
dence by simply counting the number of times they occur. In other
words, if a  particular state or policy is encountered frequently, it
will come to dominate posterior expectations. This mediates con-
text learning (in terms of the initial state) and habit learning (in terms
of policy selection). In practice, the learning updates are performed
at the end of each trial or sequence of observations. This ensures
that learning benefits from inferred (postdicted) states, after ambi-
guity has been resolved through epistemic behaviour. For example,
the agent can learn about the initial state, even if  the initial cues
were completely ambiguous.
2.5. Summary
By assuming a generic (Markovian) form for the generative
model, it is fairly easy to derive Bayesian updates that clarify the
relationships between perception, policy selection, precision and
action – and how  these quantities shape beliefs about hidden states
of the world and subsequent behaviour. In brief, the agent first
infers the hidden states under each model or policy that it enter-
tains. It  then evaluates the evidence for each policy based upon
prior beliefs or preferences about future outcomes. Having opti-
mised the precision or confidence in  beliefs about policies, they
are used to form a Bayesian model average of the next outcome,
which is  realised through action. The anatomy of the implicit mes-
sage passing is not  inconsistent with functional anatomy in the
brain: see (Friston et al., 2014)  and Figs. 1 and 2.  Fig. 2 reproduces
the (solutions to) belief updating and assigns them to  plausi-
ble brain structures. This functional anatomy rests on reciprocal
message passing among expected policies (e.g., in  the striatum)
and expected precision (e.g., in the substantia nigra). Expectations
about policies depend upon expected outcomes and states of  the
world (e.g., in the prefrontal cortex (Mushiake et al., 2006) and hip-
pocampus (Pezzulo et al., 2014; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016; Stoianov
et al., 2016)). Crucially, this scheme entails reciprocal interactions
between the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia (Botvinick and An,
2008; Pennartz et al., 2011; Verschure et al., 2014); in  particu-
lar, selection of expected (motor) outcomes by the basal ganglia
(Mannella and Baldassarre, 2015). In the next section, we consider
the formal relationships between active inference and conventional
schemes based upon value functions.
3. Relationship to Bellman formulations
Hitherto, we  have assumed that habits are  based upon learned
state transitions. However, it is possible that these transitions
could be evaluated directly, under the assumption that an opti-
mal (state-action) policy will be adopted in the future. Dynamic
programming or  backwards induction is the standard approach to
optimising state-action policies under this assumption (Bellman,
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Fig. 2. Overview of belief updates for discrete Markovian models: the left  panel lists the solutions in the main text, associating various updates with action, perception, policy
selection, precision and learning. The right panel assigns the variables (sufficient statistics or expectations) to various brain areas  to illustrate a  rough functional anatomy
–  implied by the form of the belief updates. Observed outcomes are signed to visual representations in the  occipital cortex. State estimation has been associated with the
hippocampal formation and cerebellum (or parietal cortex and dorsal striatum) for planning and habits respectively (Everitt and Robbins, 2013). The evaluation of policies,
in  terms of their (expected) free energy, has been placed in the ventral prefrontal cortex. Expectations about policies per se and the precision of these beliefs have been
assigned  to striatal and ventral tegmental areas to indicate a  putative role for dopamine in encoding precision. Finally, beliefs about policies are used to  create Bayesian model
averages of future states (over policies) – that are  fulfilled by action. The blue arrows denote message passing, while the solid red line indicates a modulatory weighting that
implements Bayesian model averaging. The broken red lines indicate the updates for parameters or connectivity (in blue circles) that depend on expectations about hidden
states (e.g., associative plasticity in the cerebellum). Please see  the appendix for an explanation of the equations and variables. The large blue arrow completes the action
perception cycle, rendering outcomes dependent upon action. (For  interpretation of the references to  colour in this figure legend, the reader is  referred to the web version
of  this article.)
1952; Howard, 1960). We can express dynamic programming using
the above notation as follows:
(8)
The first pair of equations represents the two steps of dynamic
programming. The second set of equations expresses the optimal
policy in terms of our generative model, where Bs denotes the col-
umn  of the matrix encoding the transitions from state s. In brief, the
optimal policy returns the action that maximises utility U(s) ∈  U
plus a value-function of states V(s) ∈  V. The value-function is
then evaluated under the optimal policy, until convergence. The
value-function represents the expected utility (cf., prior prefer-
ence) integrated over future states. The close relationship between
dynamic programming and backwards induction is highlighted by
the final expression for value, which is  effectively the utility over
states propagated backwards in  time by  the optimal (habitual) tran-
sition matrix.
Dynamic programming supposes that there is an optimal action
that can be taken from every state, irrespective of the context or
time of action. This is, of course, the same assumption implicit in
habit learning − and we might expect to see a correspondence
between the state transitions encoded by C =  B0 and B (we  will
return to  this in the last section). However, this correspondence will
only arise when the (Bellman) assumptions of dynamic program-
ming or backwards induction hold; i.e., when states are observed
unambiguously, such that o  =  s and U(o) =  U(s) ∈ U.  In these cases,
one can also use variational belief updating to identify the best
action from any state. This is  the action associated with the policy
that minimises expected free energy, starting from any state:
(9)
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Fig. 3. The generative model used to simulate foraging in a  three-arm maze (insert on the upper right). This model contains four control states that encode movement to
one  of four locations (three arms and a central location). These control the transition probabilities among hidden states that have a tensor product form with two  factors:
the  first is place (one of four locations), while the second is one of two  contexts. These correspond to the location of rewarding (red) outcomes and the associated cues (blue
or  green circles). Each  of the eight hidden states generates an observable outcome, where the first two  hidden states generate the  same outcome that just tells the agent
that it is at the center. Some selected transitions are  shown as arrows, indicating that control states attract the agent to different locations, where outcomes are sampled.
The  equations define the generative model in terms of its  parameters (A,B), which encode mappings from  hidden states to  outcomes and state transitions respectively. The
lower  vector corresponds to  prior preferences; namely, the agent expects to  find a  reward. Here, ⊗ denotes a Kronecker tensor product. (For interpretation of the references
to  colour in this figure legend, the reader is  referred to the web version of this article.)
This effectively composes a state-action policy by  picking the
action under the best policy from each state (assuming the current
state is known). The key point here is  that dynamic programming is
a special case of this variational scheme. One can see this by substi-
tuting the expression for value above into the first step of dynamic
programming. This is  known as direct policy iteration (Williams,
1992; Baxter et al., 2001). The ensuing policy iteration scheme can
now be expressed, not in terms of value, but in terms of future
states.
(10)
This is formally equivalent to the variational state-action pol-
icy with two differences. First, the policy iteration scheme simply
maximises expected utility, as opposed to expected free energy.
This means the risk and ambiguity terms disappear and free energy
reduces to expected utility. The second difference pertains to the
recursive iteration of future states: active inference uses variational
updates to implement Bayesian smoothing, whereas the backward
induction scheme imputes future states by recursive application of
the optimal transition matrix.
One might question the relative merits of iteratively evaluating
the value-function of states (Eq. (8)), as opposed to the states per
se (Eq, (10)).  Clearly, if one wants to deal with risk and ambiguity,
then an evaluation of the states (and their entropy) is neces-
sary. In other words, if one wants to augment conventional utility
functions with risk and ambiguity terms, it becomes necessary
to  evaluate beliefs about future states (as in  Eq. (10)). This has
a profound implication for schemes (such as dynamic program-
ming, backwards induction and reinforcement learning) based on
value functions. These schemes are, in essence, belief-free because
the construction of value functions precludes a  contribution from
beliefs about the future (unless one uses a belief MDP). This is a
key difference between (belief-based) active inference and (belief-
free) schemes based upon the Bellman assumptions. In summary,
belief-free schemes are limited to situations in  which there is  no
ambiguity about hidden states (which are  difficult to conceive in
most interesting or real-world settings). We will see an example of
this limitation in the next section. This completes our  theoretical
treatment of active inference and learning. In the last section, we
use simulations to revisit some key concepts above.
4. Simulations of foraging
This section considers inference and learning using simulations
of foraging in a  T-maze. This T-maze contains primary rewards
(such as food) and cues that are not rewarding per se  but disclose
the location of rewards. The basic principles of this problem can
be  applied to any number of scenarios (e.g., saccadic eye move-
ments to  visual targets). This is the same setup used in (Friston
et al., 2015)  and is  as simple as possible, while illustrating some
key behaviours. Crucially, this example can also be interpreted in
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terms of responses elicited in  reinforcement learning paradigms by
unconditioned (US) and conditioned (CS)  stimuli. Strictly speaking,
our paradigm is instrumental and the cue is a discriminative stim-
ulus; however, we will retain the Pavlovian nomenclature, when
relating precision updates to dopaminergic discharges.
4.1. The setup
An agent (e.g., a rat) starts in the center of a  T-maze, where either
the right or left arms are baited with a  reward (US). The lower arm
contains a discriminative cue (CS) that tells the animal whether the
reward is in the upper right or  left arm. Crucially, the agent can only
make two moves. Furthermore, the agent cannot leave the baited
arms after they are entered. This means that the optimal behaviour
is  to first go to the lower arm to find where the reward is located
and then retrieve the reward at the cued location.
In terms of a Markov decision process, there are  four control
states that correspond to visiting, or sampling, the four locations
(the center and three arms). For simplicity, we assume that each
action takes the agent to  the associated location (as opposed to
moving in a particular direction from the current location). This
is analogous to place-based navigation strategies thought to be
mediated by the hippocampus (Moser et al., 2008). There are eight
hidden states: four locations times, two contexts (right and left
reward) and seven possible outcomes. The outcomes correspond
to being in the center of the maze plus the (two) outcomes at each
of  the (three) arms that are determined by the context (the right or
left arm is more rewarding).
Having specified the state-space, it is  now  necessary to  spec-
ify the (A,B) matrices encoding contingencies. These are shown in
Fig. 3, where the A matrix maps from hidden states to outcomes,
delivering an ambiguous cue at the center (first) location and a
definitive cue at the lower (fourth) location. The remaining loca-
tions provide a reward (or not) with probability p  = 98% depending
upon the context. The B(u) matrices encode action-specific transi-
tions, with the exception of the baited (second and third) locations,
which are (absorbing) hidden states that the agent cannot leave.
One could consider learning contingencies by  updating the prior
concentration parameters (a, b) of the transition matrices but we
will assume the agent knows (i.e., has very precise beliefs about)
the contingencies. This corresponds to  making the prior concentra-
tion parameters very large. Conversely, we will use small values of
(c, d) to enable habit and context learning respectively. The param-
eters encoding prior expectations about policies (e) will be used
to preclude (this section) or permit (next section) the selection of
habitual policies. Preferences in the vector U = ln P(o) encode the
utility of outcomes. Here, the utilities of a rewarding and unreward-
ing outcome were 3 and −3  respectively (and zero otherwise). This
means, the agent expects to  be rewarded exp(3) ≈ 20 times more
than experiencing a neutral outcome. Note that utility is always rel-
ative and has a quantitative meaning in terms of preferred states.
This is important because it endows utility with the same measure
as information; namely, nats (i.e.,  units of information or  entropy
based on natural logarithms). This highlights the close connection
between value and information.
Having specified the state-space and contingencies, one can
solve the belief updating equations (Eq. (7)) to  simulate behaviour.
The (concentration) parameters of the habits were initialised to the
sum of all transition probabilities: c =
∑
u
B(u). Prior beliefs about
the initial state were initialised to  d = 8 for the central location for
each context and zero otherwise. Finally, prior beliefs about poli-
cies were initialised to e =  4 with the exception of the habit, where
e = 0. These concentration parameters can be regarded as the num-
ber of times each state, transition or  policy has been encountered
in  previous trials.
Fig.  4 summarises the (simulated) behavioural and physiologi-
cal responses over 32 successive trials using a  format that will be
adopted in  subsequent figures. Each trial comprises two actions
following an initial observation. The  top panel shows the initial
states on each trial (as coloured circles) and subsequent policy
selection (in image format) over the 11 policies considered. The
first 10 (allowable) policies correspond to staying at the center and
then moving to  each of the four locations, moving to the left or
right arm and staying there, or  moving to the lower arm and then
moving to  each of the four locations. The 11th policy corresponds
to a  habit (i.e., state-action policy). The red line shows the poste-
rior probability of selecting the habit, which is effectively zero in
these simulations because we set its prior (concentration parame-
ter) to  zero. The second panel reports the final outcomes (encoded
by coloured circles) and performance. Performance is  reported in
terms of preferred outcomes, summed over time (black bars) and
reaction times (cyan dots). Note that because preferences are log
probabilities they are  always negative – and the best outcome is
zero.2 The reaction times here are based upon the processing time
in the simulations (using the Matlab tic-toc facility) and are shown
after normalisation to a mean of zero and standard deviation of  one.
In this example, the first couple of trials alternate between the
two contexts with rewards on the right and left. After this, the con-
text (indicated by the cue) remained unchanged. For the first 20
trials, the agent selects epistemic policies, first going to  the lower
arm and then proceeding to the reward location (i.e., left for policy
#8 and right for policy #9). After this, the agent becomes increas-
ingly confident about the context and starts to  visit the reward
location directly. The differences in performance between these
(epistemic and pragmatic) behaviours are revealed in  the second
panel as a  decrease in reaction time and an increase in the aver-
age utility. This increase follows because the average is over trials
and the agent spends two  trials enjoying its preferred outcome,
when seeking reward directly – as opposed to one trial when
behaving epistemically. Note that on trial 12, the agent received
an unexpected (null) outcome that induces a degree of posterior
uncertainty about which policy it was pursuing. This is seen as
a  non-trivial posterior probability for three policies: the correct
(context-sensitive) epistemic policy and the best alternatives that
involve staying in the lower arm or  returning to the center.
The third panel shows a  succession of simulated event related
potentials following each outcome. These are the rate of change
of neuronal activity, encoding the expected probability of  hidden
states. The fourth panel shows phasic fluctuations in  posterior pre-
cision that can be interpreted in terms of dopamine responses.
Here, the phasic component of simulated dopamine responses cor-
responds to the rate of change of precision (multiplied by  eight)
and the tonic component to  the precision per se (divided by eight).
The phasic part is the precision prediction error (cf., reward predic-
tion error: see Eq. (8)). These simulated responses reveal a phasic
response to the cue (CS) during epistemic trials that emerges with
context learning over repeated trials. This reflects an implicit trans-
fer of dopamine responses from the US to  the CS. When the reward
(US) is accessed directly there is a profound increase in  the phasic
response, relative to the response elicited after it has been predicted
by the CS.
The final two panels show context and habit learning: the penul-
timate panel shows the accumulated posterior expectations about
the initial state D, while the lower panels show the posterior expec-
tations of habitual state transitions, C. The implicit learning reflects
2 Utilities can only be specified to within an additive constant (the log normali-
sation constant) because of the sum to one constraint of probabilities. This means
that although preferred outcomes were specified with utilities between −3  and +3,
the actual utilities are negative.
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Fig. 4. Simulated responses over  32  trials: this figure reports the behavioural and (simulated) physiological responses during successive trials. The first panel shows, for each
trial, the initial state (as blue and red circles indicating the context) and the selected policy (in image format) over the 11  policies considered. The policies are selected in the
first  two  trials correspond to  epistemic policies (#8 and #9), which involve examining the  cue in the lower arm and then going to  the left  or right arm to  secure the reward
(depending on the context). After the agent becomes sufficiently confident that the context does not  change (after trial 21) it indulges in pragmatic behaviour, accessing the
reward  directly. The red line shows the posterior ability of selecting the habit, which is  was set to zero in these simulations. The second panel reports the final outcomes
(encoded by coloured circles: cyan and blue for rewarding outcomes in the left and right arms) and performance measures in terms of preferred outcomes, summed over time
(black  bars) and reaction times (cyan dots). The third panel shows a  succession of simulated event related potentials following each outcome. These are taken to  be the  rate
of  change of neuronal activity, encoding the expected probability of hidden states. The fourth panel shows phasic fluctuations in posterior precision that can  be interpreted
in  terms of dopamine responses. The final two panels show context and habit learning, expressed in terms of (C,D): the penultimate panel shows the accumulated posterior
beliefs  about the initial state, while the lower panels show the posterior expectations of habitual state transitions. Here, each panel shows the expected transitions among
the  eight hidden states (see Fig. 3), where each column encodes the probability of moving from one state to another. Please see main text for a  detailed description of these
responses. (For interpretation of the  references to colour in this  figure legend, the reader is  referred to the web version of this  article.)
an  accumulation of evidence that the reward will be found in  the
same location. In other words, initially ambiguous priors over the
first two hidden states come to reflect the agent’s experience that
it always starts in the first hidden state. It is this context learn-
ing that underlies the pragmatic behaviour in later trials. We  talk
about context learning (as opposed to inference) because, strictly
speaking, Bayesian updates to  model parameters (between trials)
are referred to as learning, while updates to hidden states (within
trial) correspond to  inference.
Finally, the expected state transitions under a habitual policy
show the emergence of an epistemic policy, in which the agent
always goes to  the lower (fourth) location from the central (first)
location, irrespective of context. It then locates the appropriate
(second or third) locations. It is more confident about vicarious
transitions to the second location, because these predominate in
its recent experience. The next section considers learning in more
detail, looking first at context learning and then habit learning.
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5. Simulations of learning
This section illustrates the distinction between context and habit
learning. In the previous section, context learning enabled more
informed and confident (pragmatic) behaviour as the agent became
familiar with its environment. In this section, we consider how the
same context learning can lead to perseveration and thereby influ-
ence reversal learning, when contingencies change. Following this,
we turn to habit learning and simulate some cardinal aspects of
devaluation. Finally, we turn to epistemic habits and close by com-
paring an acquired with and without ambiguous outcomes. This
serves to highlight the difference between belief-based and belief-
free  schemes – and illustrates the convergence of active inference
and belief-free schemes, when the world is fully observed.
5.1. Context and reversal learning
Fig. 5 uses the format of Fig. 4 to  illustrate behavioural and phys-
iological responses induced by reversal learning. In this example,
64 trials were simulated with a  switch in context to a  (consistent)
reward location from the left to  the right arm after 32 trials. The
upper panel shows that after about 16 trials the agent is suffi-
ciently confident about the context to  go straight to the rewarding
location; thereby switching from an epistemic to  a pragmatic pol-
icy. Prior to this switch, phasic dopamine responses to  the reward
(US) progressively diminish and are transferred to  the discrimi-
native cue (CS) (Fiorillo et al., 2003). After adopting a  pragmatic
policy, dopamine responses to the US disappear because they are
completely predictable and afford no further increase in  precision.
Crucially, after 32 trials the context changes but the (pragmatic)
policy persists, leading to  4 trials in  which the agent goes to  the
wrong location. After this, it reverts to an epistemic policy and,
after a period of context learning, adopts a  new pragmatic pol-
icy. Behavioural perseveration of this sort is mediated purely by
prior beliefs about context that accumulate over trials. Here, this is
reflected in the prior belief about the hidden states encountered at
the beginning of each new trial (shown as a function of trials in the
fifth panel). This context learning is  illustrated in the right panel,
which shows the number of perseverative trials before reversal, as
a function of previous exposures to the original context.
Note that this form of reversal learning reflects changes in  prior
expectations about the hidden states generating the first outcome.
This should be contrasted with learning a reversal of contingencies
encoded by the state transition parameters, or parameters map-
ping from states to outcomes. Learning these parameters would
also produce reversal learning and a  number of other phenomena
in psychology; such as effect of partial reinforcement (Delamater
and Westbrook, 2014). However, in this paper, we focus on con-
text and habit learning; as opposed to contingency learning. The
above demonstration of reversal learning proceeded in  the absence
of habits. In the remaining simulations, we  enabled habit learning
by allowing its (concentration) parameter to accumulate over trials.
5.2. Habit formation and devaluation
Fig. 6 uses the same format as the previous figure to illustrate
habit formation and the effects of devaluation. Devaluation pro-
vides a critical test for dissociable (goal-directed or contingency and
habitual or incentive) learning mechanisms in  psychology (Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). The left-hand pan-
els show habit learning over 64 trials in  which the context was held
constant. The posterior probability of the habitual policy is shown
in the upper panel (solid red line), where the habit is  underwritten
by the state transitions in the lower panels. This simulation shows
that as habitual transitions are learnt, the posterior probability of
the habit increases until it is  executed routinely. In this case, the
acquired habit corresponds to  an epistemic policy (policy #8), and
after the habit has been acquired, there is  no opportunity for prag-
matic policies. This means that although the behaviour is efficient
in  terms of reaction times, the habit has precluded exploitative
behaviour (Dayan et al., 2006). The reason why this habit has epis-
temic components is because it was learned under prior beliefs
that both contexts were equally likely; conversely, a habit acquired
under a  different prior could be  pragmatic.
One might ask  why  a habit is  selected over a  sequential pol-
icy that predicts the same behaviour. The habit is selected because
it provides a  better explanation for observed outcomes. This is
because the joint distribution over successive states is encoded by
the concentration parameters c ⊂  (see Eq. (6)). Technically, this
means that habits have less complexity and free energy path inte-
grals. One can see this anecdotally in  the transition matrices on the
lower left of Fig. 6:  if we  were in the seventh state after the first
move, we can be almost certain we started in the first state. How-
ever, under the model of transitions provided by the best sequential
policy (policy #8), the empirical prior afforded by knowing we were
in  the seventh state is less definitive (we  could have moved from
the first state or  we could have already been in the seventh).
During the acquisition of the habit, the reaction times decrease
with maintained performance and systematic changes in phasic
dopamine responses (fourth panel). An important correlate of habit
learning is the attenuation of electrophysiological responses (e.g.,
in the hippocampus). This reflects the fact that  the equivalent
belief updates for the habit (e.g., in  the cerebellum, parietal cortex
and dorsolateral striatum (Everitt and Robbins, 2013)), have been
deliberately omitted from the graphics. This effective transfer of
sequential processing (from hippocampus to cerebellar cortex) may
provide a simple explanation for the putative transfer in  real brains
during memory consolidation; for example, during sleep (Buzsaki,
1998; Kesner, 2000; Pezzulo et al., 2014).
Crucially, after the habit was acquired the reward was  devalued
by switching the prior preferences (at trial 48), such that the neu-
tral outcome became the preferred outcome (denoted by the green
shaded areas). Despite this switch, the habit persists and, indeed,
reinforces itself with repeated executions. The right panels report
exactly the same simulation when the rewards were devalued after
16 trials, before the habit was  fully acquired. In  this instance, the
agent switches its behaviour immediately (before sampling the
devalued outcome) and subsequently acquires a habit that is con-
sistent with its preferences (compare the transition probabilities
in  the lower panels). In other words, prior to habit formation, goal
directed behaviour is sensitive to  devaluation – a  sensitivity that
is lost under habitual control. These simulations demonstrate the
resistance of habitual policies to devaluation resulting in  subopti-
mal  performance (but faster reaction times: see second panel). See
Dayan et al. (2006) for a discussion of how habits can confound
learning in this way.
5.3. Epistemic habit acquisition under ambiguity
Fig.  7 illustrates the acquisition of epistemic habits under
ambiguous (left  panels) and unambiguous (right panels) outcome
contingencies. In these simulations, the context switches randomly
from one trial to the next. The left panels show the rapid acquisition
of an epistemic habit after about 16 trials of epistemic cue-seeking.
As the agent observes its own habitual behaviour, the prior proba-
bility of the habit increases (dotted red line in  the upper panel). This
prior probability is based upon the policy concentration param-
eters, e ⊂  . The lower panels show the state transitions under
the habitual policy; properly enforcing a visit to  the cue location
followed by appropriate reward seeking.
This policy should be contrasted with the so-called optimal
policy provided by dynamic programming (and the equivalent vari-
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Fig. 5. Reversal learning: this figure uses  the format of Fig. 4 to illustrate behavioural and physiological responses induced by reversal learning. In this example, 64 trials
were  simulated with a  switch in context from one (consistent) reward location to another. The upper panel shows that after about 16  trials the agent is  sufficiently confident
about the context to go straight to  the rewarding location; thereby switching from an  epistemic to a pragmatic policy. After 32  trials the  context changes but the (pragmatic)
policy  persists; leading to 4 trials in which the  agent goes to the wrong location. After this, it reverts to an epistemic policy and, after a  period of context learning, adopts
a  new pragmatic policy. Behavioural perseveration of this sort is mediated purely by prior beliefs about context that accumulate over trials. This is illustrated in the right
panel,  which shows the number of perseverations after reversal, as a function of the number of preceding (consistent) trials.
ational estimate) in  the lower panels: these are  the solutions to
Eqs. (9) and (10).  Clearly, the ‘optimal’ policy is  to go  straight to
the rewarding location in  each context (or hidden state); however,
this is no use when outcomes are ambiguous and the agent does
not know which context it is  in. This means the optimal (epistemic)
state-action policy under active inference (left panel) is fundamen-
tally different from the optimal (pragmatic) habit under dynamic
programming (right panel). This distinction can be dissolved by
making the outcomes unambiguous. The right panels report the
results of an identical simulation with one important difference
– the outcomes observed from the starting location unambigu-
ously specify the context. In this instance, all state-action policies
are formally identical (although transitions from the cue location
are not evaluated under active inference, because they are never
encountered).
5.4. Summary
In summary, these simulations suggest that agents should
acquire epistemic habits – and can only do so through belief-
based learning. There is nothing remarkable about epistemic
habits; they are entirely consistent with the classical conception
of habits – in  the animal learning literature – as chains of  stimulus-
response associations. The key aspect here is that they can be
acquired (autodidactically) via observing epistemic goal-directed
behaviour.
6. Conclusion
We  have described an active inference scheme for discrete state-
space models of choice behaviour that is suitable for modelling a
variety of paradigms and phenomena. Although goal-directed and
habitual policies are usually considered in  terms of model-based
and model-free schemes, we  find the more important distinction is
between belief-free versus belief-based schemes; namely, whether
the current state is sufficient to specify an action or whether it is
necessary to  consider beliefs about states (e.g., uncertainty). Fur-
thermore, we show that conventional formulations (based on the
Bellman optimality principle) apply only in  the belief-free setting,
when cues are unambiguous. Finally, we show how habits can
emerge naturally from goal-directed behaviour.
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Fig. 6. Habit formation and devaluation: this figure uses the same format as the previous figure to  illustrate habit formation and the effects of devaluation. The left panels
show habit learning over 64  trials in which the context was  held constant. The posterior probability of the  habitual policy is shown in the upper panel (solid red  line), where
the  habit is underwritten by the state transitions shown in the lower panels. The  simulation shows that as the  habitual transitions are  learnt, the posterior probability of the
habit  increases until it is  executed routinely. After the habit had been acquired, we devalued the reward by switching the prior preferences such that the  neutral outcome
became  the preferred outcome (denoted by  the green shaded areas). Despite this preference reversal, the habit persists. The right panels report the same simulation when the
reward was devalued after 16 trials, before the habit was fully acquired. In this instance, the agent switches immediately to the new preference and subsequently acquires
a  habit that is consistent with its  preferences (compare the transition probabilities in the lower panels). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend,
the  reader is referred to  the  web  version of this article.)
To the extent that one accepts the variational (active inference)
formulation of behaviour, there are interesting implications for the
distinction between habitual and goal-directed behaviour. If we
associate model-free learning with habit-learning, then model-free
learning emerges from model-based behaviour. In  other words,
model-based planning engenders and contextualises model-free
learning. In this sense, active inference suggests there can be no
model-free scheme that is learned autonomously or divorced from
goal-directed (model-based) behaviour. There are further impli-
cations for the role of value-functions and backwards induction
in standard approaches to  model-based planning. Crucially, varia-
tional formulations do not refer to  value-functions of states, even
when optimising habitual (state-action) policies. Put simply, learn-
ing in active inference corresponds to optimising the parameters
of a generative model. In this instance, the parameters correspond
to state transitions that lead to valuable (preferred) states. At  no
point do we need to learn an intermediary value-function from
which these transitions are derived. In sum, the important distinc-
tion between goal-directed and habitual behaviour may  not be the
distinction between model-based and model-free but the distinc-
tion between selecting policies that are  and are not sensitive to
context or ambiguity; i.e. belief-based versus belief-free.
One might ask whether active inference makes any predictions
about responses that have yet to be  observed empirically. At the
level of behavioural predictions, the answer is probably no. This
follows from something called the complete class theorem (Brown,
1981), which states that for any observed behaviour and utility
function there exists a  prior that renders the behaviour Bayes opti-
mal. Because active inference absorbs utility functions into prior
preferences, this means there is always a  set of prior preferences
that renders any behaviour (approximately) Bayes optimal. At  first
glance, this may  seem disappointing; however, turning the argu-
ment on its head, the complete class theorem means that we can
always characterise behaviour in terms of prior preferences. This
is important because it means one can computationally phenotype
any behaviour and start to  quantify – and understand – the prior
beliefs that subjects bring to any paradigm. This is  a  tenet of compu-
tational psychiatry (Huys et al., 2011; Montague et al., 2012; Wang
and Krystal, 2014), which motivates much of the work reported
above.
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Fig. 7. Epistemic habit acquisition under ambiguity: this figure uses the same format as Fig. 6 to  illustrate the acquisition of epistemic habits under ambiguous (left panels)
and  unambiguous (right panels) outcomes. The left panels show the rapid acquisition of an epistemic habit after about 16 trials of epistemic cue-seeking, when the context
switches randomly from one trial to  the next. The lower panels show the  state  transitions under the habitual policy; properly enforcing a  visit to the cue location followed by
appropriate reward seeking. This policy should be contrasted with the so-called optimal policy provided by dynamic programming (and the equivalent variational estimate)
in  the lower panels. The  optimal (epistemic) state-action policy is fundamentally different from the optimal (pragmatic) habit under dynamic programming. This distinction
can  be dissolved by making the outcomes unambiguous. The right panels report the results of an identical simulation, where outcomes observed from the  starting location
specify  the context unambiguously.
At  the level of the particular (neuronal) process theory described
in this paper, there are many predictions about the neuronal cor-
relates of perception, evaluation, policy selection and the encoding
of uncertainty associated with dopaminergic discharges. For  exam-
ple, the key difference between expected free energy and value is
the epistemic component or information gain. This means that a
strong prediction (which to our knowledge has not yet been tested)
is that a mildly aversive outcome that reduces uncertainty about the
experimental or environmental context will elicit a  positive phasic
dopaminergic response.
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Appendix A.
Belief updating: variational updates are  a  self-consistent set of
equalities that minimise variational free energy, which can be
expressed as the (time-dependent) free energy under each policy
plus the complexity incurred by posterior beliefs about (time-
invariant) policies and parameters, where (ignoring constants and
using  = {a, b, c, d, e, ˇ});
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Free energy and its expectation are given by:
Here,
⌢
B =
⌢
B(()),
⌢
B0 =
⌢
C and
⌢
B
0
s
0
=
⌢
D. B(d) is the beta  func-
tion of the column vector d and the remaining variables are:
Using the standard result: ∂dB(d) = B(d)
⌢
D,  we can differentiate
the variational free energy with respect to the sufficient statistics
(with a slight abuse of notation and using ∂sF:=∂F(, )/∂s):
Finally, the solutions to these equations give the variational
updates in the main text (Eq. (7)).
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